Southeast Asian perceptions of Australia\u27s foreign policy by Snyder, Craig
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Snyder, Craig 2006, Southeast Asian perceptions of Australia's foreign policy, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia : a journal of international and strategic affairs, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 322-340. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30003661 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
Copyright : 2006, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
322
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 2 (2006), pp. 322–40	 DOI:	10.1355/cs28-2g
©	2006	ISEAS	 ISSN	0219-797X	print	/	ISSN	1793-284X	electronic
Southeast Asian Perceptions 
of Australia’s Foreign Policy
Craig a. Snyder
This article argues that while the US alliance remains at the forefront 
of australian security policy, the deepening of ties between the United 
States and australia has the potential to complicate australia’s relations 
with its Southeast asian neighbours. Moreover, the manner in which 
the Howard government has attempted to manage this shift in policy 
has only exacerbated the problem. australian pronouncements of 
support for the US policy of pre-emption, the perceived preference of 
the australian Prime Minister to take on the role of “deputy Sheriff”, 
and the unwieldy approach taken by the australian government in 
policy announcements pertaining to maritime and security policy have 
caused unnecessary tension and mistrust between australia and some 
Southeast asian states.
Keywords:	 Australia–Southeast	 Asia	 relations,	 Howard	 government,	 “Deputy	
Sheriff”,	Australian	 foreign	policy,	Australia-US	alliance.
Australia’s	 Asia-Pacific	 regional	 security	 policy	 has	 traditionally	
seen	 a	 balancing	 between	 two	 competing	 policy	 approaches,	 one	 of	
seeking	protection	 from	threats	 in	 the	 region	by	“great	and	powerful	
friends”	 and	 the	 other	 of	 greater	 engagement	with	 the	 region.	 Since	
coming	 to	 office	 in	 1996,	 the	 Howard	 Coalition	 government	 has	
sought	to	redress	what	it	saw	as	a	dangerous	swing	towards	the	later	
approach	 by	 the	 previous	 Hawke-Keating	 Labor	 governments	 and	
sought	 to	 reinvigorate	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 United	 States.	 This	
policy	 of	 closer	 ties	 with	 the	 United	 States	 began	 with	 a	 renewal	
of	 the	 Australia-US	 alliance	 in	 1996	 and	 strong	 diplomatic	 support	
for	 US	 actions	 vis-à-vis	 China	 over	 Taiwan	 in	 that	 year.	 Following	
the	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 New	 York	 and	Washington	 on	 11	 September	
2001,	Australia	has	even	 further	 intensified	 its	positioning	alongside	
07 Craig p322-340.indd   322 9/25/06   11:33:00 AM
	 323Southeast asian Perceptions of australia’s Foreign Policy	
of	 the	United	States	 in	 global	 strategic	 affairs.	Australia,	 for	 the	first	
time,	 invoked	 the	 ANZUS	 Treaty	 (Australia,	 New	 Zealand,	 United	
States	 Security	 Treaty)	 in	 response	 to	 the	 attacks.	 It	 sent	 troops	 to	
Afghanistan	 as	 part	 of	 the	 “war	 on	 terror”.	 It	 sent	 into	 battle	 its	
largest	military	 force	 since	 the	 Vietnam	war	 as	 part	 of	 the	 coalition	
in	the	war	in	Iraq.	In	addition,	it	was	an	early	and	active	participant	
in	 the	 Proliferation	 Security	 Initiative,	 hosting	 the	 second	 plenary	
meeting	 in	 Brisbane	 in	 July	 2003	 and	 hosting	 a	 major	 exercise	 in	
April	 2006.
Alongside	 of	 this	 reinvigoration	 of	 the	 alliance	with	 the	United	
States,	 the	 Howard	 government	 has	 also	 shifted	 away	 from	 a	
more	 passive	 cooperative	 regional	 security	 policy	 towards	 a	 more	
aggressive	 globalist	 policy.	 In	 late	 November	 and	 early	 December	
2002,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 terrorist	 attack	 in	 Bali,	 which	 killed	
202	 people	 including	 88	 Australians,	 the	 Australian	 government	
expressed	 its	 support	 for	 a	 policy	 of	 pre-emptive	 self-defence	
following	 the	 release	 of	 the	 US	 National	 Security	 Strategy	 (NSS).1	
In	addition,	Australia	began	 to	advocate	 for	a	 revision	 in	 the	United	
Nations	 Charter	 that	 would	 weaken	 the	 norm	 of	 non-interference	
in	 the	 domestic	 affairs	 of	 states.	 On	 1	 December	 2002,	 Howard	
was	 asked	 by	 Laurie	 Oakes	 on	 the	 Channel	 9	 Sunday	 news	 and	
current	 affairs	 TV	 programme,	 “you’ve	 been	 arguing	 for	 a	 new	
approach	 to	 pre-emptive	 defence	…	 [d]oes	 that	mean	 that	…	 if	 you	
knew	that	…	people	 in	another	neighbouring	country	were	planning	
an	 attack	 on	 Australia	 that	 you	 would	 be	 prepared	 to	 act?”	 He	
replied
…	it	stands	to	reason	that	if	you	believed	that	somebody	was	going	
to	 launch	 an	 attack	 against	 your	 country,	 either	 of	 a	 conventional	
kind	 or	 of	 a	 terrorist	 kind,	 and	 you	 had	 a	 capacity	 to	 stop	 it	 and	
there	 was	 no	 alternative	 other	 than	 to	 use	 that	 capacity	 then	 of	
course	 you	would	 have	 to	 use	 it.	 (Australia	 Department	 of	 Prime	
Minister	 and	Cabinet	 2002)
While	 Howard’s	 answer	 to	 this	 question	may	 sound	 reasonable	
in	 regard	 to	 self-defence	 when	 no	 other	 options	 are	 available,	 this	
statement	 caused	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 controversy	 among	 the	 Southeast	
Asian	 states	 as	 it	 was	 popularly	 cast	 as	 an	 Australian	 declaration	
of	a	pre-emptive	strike	doctrine.	Many	official	 statements	and	media	
commentaries	 from	 the	 region	 expressed	 their	 condemnation	 of	 the	
perceived	 Australian	 challenge	 to	 their	 sovereignty.	 Malaysia’s	 then	
Prime	Minister	Mohamad	Mahathir	 (cited	 in	Bhatia	2002),	an	ardent	
critic	 of	 the	 tendency	 of	 Australian	 and	 other	 Western	 states	 to	
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impose	 their	views	on	 the	Malaysian	government	and	society,	 stated	
that	the	policy	demonstrates	Howard’s	“belligerence	and	recalcitrance	
and	his	anti-Asian	hide”.	Official	spokesmen	for	Indonesia,	Thailand,	
and	 the	Philippines	all	 criticized	 the	policy	as	flouting	 international	
law	 (Burton	 2002;	 Straits Times	 2002;	 ABC	 Radio	 National	 2005).	
Even	 Singapore,	 a	 traditional	 supporter	 of	 Australia’s	 role	 in	 the	
region,	criticized	the	Australian	statement.	Singapore’s	Deputy	Prime	
Minister	 and	 Defence	 Minister,	 Tony	 Tan	 (cited	 in	 Baguioro	 2002)	
stated	 that	 while	 self-defence	 is	 the	 right	 of	 all	 states,	 “the	 use	 of	
force	must	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 international	 law”.	While	
this	 statement	 is	 by	 itself	 hardly	 a	 condemnation	 of	 the	 policy,	 the	
fact	 that	 the	 Singapore	 government	 felt	 compelled	 to	 respond	 at	
all	 reflects	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 negative	 impact	 this	 statement	 had	 on	
Australia’s	 relations	with	 the	 region.	 In	Southeast	Asia,	 the	problem	
is	 that	 the	 policy	 implies	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 many	 of	
the	 states	 in	 the	 region,	 especially	 those	 that	 have	 a	 large	 Islamic	
population	and	where	increasingly	the	Western	media	portrays	them	
as	 being	 hotbeds	 of	 Islamic	 terrorism.	
While	 Australia	 has	 not	 moved	 to	 articulate	 a	 clear	 policy	 in	
support	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	 media	 comment,	 the	 government	
has	 announced	 changes	 in	 the	 strategic	 concept	 of	 the	 Australian	
Defence	 Force	 (ADF)	 moving	 it	 towards	 more	 offensive-minded	
capabilities.	 In	 the	 2000	 Defence	 White	 Paper,	 the	 2003	 Strategic	
Review,	 and	 again	 in	 the	 2005	 Strategic	 Review,	 the	 government	
announced	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 the	 decades-old	 policy	 of	 “Defence	
of	Australia”	 to	one	where	 the	ADF	is	structured	to	be	better	able	 to	
participate	in	coalition	forces	further	a	field	from	Australia’s	immediate	
neighbourhood.	 This	 restructuring	 will	 also	 allow	 Australia	 to	 play	
a	 more	 active	 role	 within	 the	 region	 either	 in	 coalition	 with	 other	
states	or	 independently	 as	 seen	 in	 the	2003	Australian	 led–Regional	
Assistance	Mission	 to	 Solomon	 Islands	 (RAMSI)	 and	more	 recently	
in	 response	 to	 the	 breakdown	 of	 law	 and	 order	 in	 East	 Timor	 in	
May–June	2006.
While	many	policy-makers	in	the	region	are	generally	supportive	
of	 Australia’s	 role	 in	 the	 region	 and	 indeed	 look	 towards	 Australia	
for	support	in	regional	security	issues	such	as	diplomatic	leadership,	
military	 training,	 and	 assistance	 against	 military	 and	 non-military	
threats	 to	 security,	 there	 exists	 some	 concern	 as	 to	 how	 Australia	
perceives	 its	 place	 in	 the	 region.	 Australia’s	 reliance	 on	 traditional	
alliance	partnerships,	especially	with	 the	United	States,	alongside	of	
its	 perceived	 policy	 of	 pre-emption	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	
how	 the	 region	 relates	 to	Australia.	
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Evolution of Australia’s Post–Cold War Regional Security Policy 
Cooperative Security
In	 the	 late	 1980s,	 even	 before	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 Australia,	
under	the	Hawke-Keating	Labor	governments,	began	a	shift	away	from	
its	 traditional	 reliance	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 a	 “great	 and	 powerful	
friend”	 to	 explore	 multilateral	 approaches	 to	 security	 that	 sought	
security	“with”	Asia	 rather	 than	security	“from”	Asia.	 In	 this	period	
Australia	stood	at	the	forefront	of	the	debates	over	the	development	of	
multilateral	cooperative	security	structures	for	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	
Australia	 supported	 the	 establishment	 of	 multilateral	 cooperative	
security	mechanisms,	principally	 the	ASEAN	Regional	Forum	 (ARF)	
and	the	“Second	Track”,	Council	for	Security	and	Cooperation	in	the	
Asia-Pacific	 (CSCAP).	While	 there	was	general	support	 in	Australian	
government	circles	for	this	multilateral	cooperative	security	approach,	
especially	 the	ARF,	 some	doubts	 remained	 as	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
such	 an	 approach	 to	 deliver	 regional	 peace	 and	 stability	 over	 the	
short	 to	 medium	 term.	 As	 a	 result,	 Australia	 retained	 its	 bilateral	
defence	 arrangements	 as	 a	 means	 of	 decreasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	
military	 threat	 to	Australia	emerging	 from	Asia.	 In	 the	1994	Defence	
White	Paper	 it	 is	 clearly	 stated	 that	 the	ANZUS	alliance	 remained	a	
key	 element	of	Australia’s	defence	policy.
Howard doctrine and its discontents
Following	its	election	in	1996,	the	new	Howard	Coalition	government,	
distrustful	of	this	approach,	began	to	shift	away	from	multilateralism	
and	 sought	 to	 deepen	 its	 ties	 with	 the	 United	 States.	 Australian	
critics	of	the	government	saw	this	as	a	return	to	a	policy	of	“Forward	
Defence”	where	Australia	sought	to	protect	itself	from	hostile	regional	
forces	 by	 closely	 aligning	 itself	 with	 the	 United	 States	 and	 actively	
engaging	these	threats	before	they	could	threaten	Australian	national	
interests.
With	 this	 shift,	 some	 in	 the	 region	 became	 concerned	 as	 to	
Australia’s	 threat	 perceptions	 and	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 Australia-
US	 relationship.	 China	 in	 particular	 was	 concerned	 that	 Australia’s	
alliance	with	 the	United	States	was	part	of	a	broader	American	new	
“containment”	 strategy.	 Chinese	 commentators	 noted	 the	 increased	
level	of	military	cooperation	between	the	United	States	and	Australia	
under	the	Coalition	government.	Shi	Yongming	(1997,	pp.	32–33),	an	
Associate	 Research	 Fellow	 at	 the	 Chinese	 Institute	 for	 International	
Studies,	 argued	 that	 the	 1996	 “Sydney	 Declaration”	 of	 renewed	
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Australian-US	military	cooperation	and	the	resulting	exercise	“Tandem	
Thrust	 97”	 implied	 that	 Australia	 provided	 the	 United	 States	 with	
a	 replacement	 training	 area	 for	Asia-Pacific	military	 exercises	 that	 it	
lost	following	the	American	withdrawal	from	the	Philippines	in	1992.	
China	was	also	concerned	 that	Australia	had	been	 the	most	vocal	of	
the	Asia-Pacific	 states	 in	 supporting	American	 “gunboat	 diplomacy”	
in	 the	 region	 such	 as	 the	 dispatch	 of	 two	 US	 aircraft	 carrier	 battle	
groups	to	Taiwan	during	the	1996	Taiwan	Straits	crisis.	Australia	was	
also,	 according	 to	 Shi,	 one	 of	 the	 only	 states	 in	 the	 world	 to	 have	
supported	 the	 American	 cruise	missile	 strikes	 into	 southern	 Iraq	 in	
September	 1996.	Moreover,	many	Chinese	 newspapers	 reported	 that	
Australia	had	failed	to	gain	acceptance	in	Asia	and,	more	specifically	
in	1996	a	seat	at	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	because	of	the	
Coalition	government’s	renewal	of	Australia’s	alliance	with	the	United	
States.	 For	 example,	 “[s]uch	 parrot-like	 behaviour	 can	 only	 lead	 to	
unpopularity	in	the	international	community”,	the	China daily	reported	
(cited	 in	Agence	France-Presse	1996;	 see	 also	Greenlees	1997).	
Others	 in	 Asia	 were	 similarly	 concerned	 about	 the	 Howard	
government’s	 reinvigorating	 of	 the	 ANZUS	 alliance.	 Australian	
academic	Des	Ball	 (1997,	p.	 167)	 argued	 at	 the	 time	 that	 “there	was	
inadequate	consultation	with	Australia’s	neighbours	in	South-East	[sic]	
Asia,	several	of	whom	expressed	bemusement	at	Australia’s	efforts	and	
especially	at	 some	of	 the	particular	moves,	 such	as	exercise	Tandem	
Thrust”.	He	also	argued	 that	 the	Howard	government	politicized	 the	
relationship	and	that	“the	policy	was	poorly	cast	in	terms	of	regional	
understanding”.	This	reliance	on	US	security	guarantees	implied	that	
Australia’s	 threat-perceptions	 focused	 more	 on	 traditional	 threats	
emanating	 from	a	hostile	 region.	
The	ability	of	Australia	to	engage	effectively	with	both	the	United	
States	 and	 all	 of	 Asia	 was	 questioned	 well	 before	 the	 re-emphasis	
the	Howard	government	put	onto	its	relations	with	the	United	States.	
Joon	 Num	Mak	 (1994,	 p.	 58),	 a	Malaysian	 defence	 commentator,	 in	
1994	 questioned	 whether	 Australia	 could	 effectively	 engage	 with	
all	 of	 the	 states	 in	 the	 region,	 or	 even	 nearer	 sub-region,	 without	
neglecting	 its	 traditional	 alliance	partners.	Alternatively,	 if	Australia	
became	 selective	 in	 the	 extent	 of	 its	 cooperative	 relationships	 with	
regional	 powers,	 how	would	 those	 states	 with	minimal	 cooperation	
react	 to	 this,	 in	 effect,	 weakening	 of	 their	 relations	 with	 Australia?	
This	 is	 not	 a	 universally	 accepted	 view	 in	 the	 region	 and	 indeed	
many,	 both	 in	 Australia	 and	 in	 Southeast	 Asia,	 doubt	 the	 zero-sum	
nature	 implied	 in	 the	 “US	 v.	 Asia”	 debate.2	 The	 point	 here	 is	 that	
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given	 the	 finite	 resources	 available	 to	 any	 state	 in	 its	 foreign	 and	
defence	 relations,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 “winners”	 and	 “losers”	 in	 regard	
to	 the	 level	 of	 engagement	 it	 has	 with	 other	 states.	 Therefore,	 the	
resources	 that	 Australia	 “spends”	 in	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 United	
States	are	not	available	to	be	“spent”	in	Asia.	Des	Ball	(1997,	p.	169)	
makes	 a	 similar	 point	 in	 testimony	 to	 the	Australian	 Joint	 Standing	
Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs,	Defence	 and	Trade
the	Australia-US	 security	 relationship	 is	 very	 complex	 and	 in	 the	
context	 of	 enhanced	 multilateralism	 in	 South-East	 [sic]	 Asia	 it	
involves	sensitive	judgments,	hard	choices	and	careful	balances.	At	
the	most	general	level,	there	is	a	need	for	a	careful	balance	between	
…	 the	 US	 alliance	 and	 other	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 security	
arrangements	 in	Australia’s	national	 security	policy.
The	most	powerful	image	that	illustrates	the	danger,	in	the	mind	
of	the	Southeast	Asia	states	of	the	closeness	of	Australia’s	relationship	
with	 the	 United	 States,	 however,	 was	 the	 claim	 of	 Australia	 as	 the	
American	 “Deputy	 Sheriff’	 reported	 in	 an	 interview	 in	 the	 Bulletin 
magazine	 in	 1999.	 The	 report	 quotes	 Howard	 as	 saying	 “he	 saw	
Australia	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘deputy’	 to	 the	American	 global	 sheriff”	 (Cook	
1999;	 also	 cited	 in	Murphy	 2002).	While	 the	 government	was	 quick	
to	 clarify	 the	 report,	 accusing	 the	 journalist	 of	 putting	 the	 words	
into	Mr	Howard’s	mouth,	 the	 title	 has	 stuck	 and	 as	 such	 constantly	
reinforces	 the	 closeness	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 states	
—	 at	 least	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 those	 elements	 within	 Southeast	 Asian	
societies	 that	 are	 already	 predisposed	 to	 think	 poorly	 of	 the	United	
States	 and	Australia.
Australia’s	 close	 cultural	 ties	 with	 the	 United	 States	 have	
influenced	 how	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world,	 especially	 the	 Southeast	
Asian	 states,	 view	 Australia.	 There	 are	 two	 areas	 where	 the	 close	
relationship	with	 the	United	States	 hurts	Australia,	 first,	 the	 impact	
of	US	culture	on	Southeast	Asian	societies	and	second,	concern	over	
the	resurgence	of	US	military	adventurism.	The	United	States	is	often	
seen	 as	 the	 primary	 agent	 of	 the	 challenges	 that	many	 in	 Southeast	
Asia	perceive	 they	 face,	 be	 it	 an	 attack	on	 traditional	 languages	 and	
culture	 from	 US	 mass	 media,	 challenges	 to	 traditional	 values	 from	
Western	liberalism,	or	challenges	to	their	sovereignty	from	globalization	
(Dibb	1993,	pp.	59–60).	In	many	ways	there	is	very	little	that	Australia	
can	do	 to	disassociate	 itself	 from	 these	 types	of	 attacks.	While	 there	
are	 differences	 between	 Labor	 and	 Coalition	 governments	 over	 the	
emphasis	placed	on	 the	 relationship	with	 the	United	States,	 there	 is	
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general	bipartisan	support	for	close	cultural	alignment	with	the	United	
States.	 This	 has	 made	 it	 difficult	 for	 Australia	 to	 distinguish	 itself	
from	 the	 United	 State’s	 lead	 on	 global	 issues	 such	 as	 proliferation	
of	weapons	of	mass	destruction,	 freedom	of	navigation,	and	regional	
intervention	 (Singh	2002).
This	 is	 not	 to	 imply	 that	Australia’s	 close	 relationship	with	 the	
United	 States	 is	 unwarranted	 or	 even	 that	 it	 is	 completely	 negative	
in	 terms	 of	Australia’s	 relations	with	Southeast	Asian	 states.	 Indeed	
most	of	 the	states	 in	Southeast	Asia	 support	an	ongoing	US	military	
and	 strategic	 role	 in	 the	 region	 and	 agree	 that	 Australia	 plays	 a	
valuable	 role	 in	 supporting	 and	 securing	 this	 commitment	 (Huisken	
2001,	p.	20).	Many	states	in	Southeast	Asia	value	the	US	presence	as	
a	stabilizing	element	in	the	region	and	see	Australia	as	an	important	
link	with	 the	United	States.
The	 ultimate	 judge	 of	 the	 value	 of	 any	 US	 role	 in	 the	 Asia-
Pacific	 is	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 Americans	 achieve	 the	 delicate	
balance	 between	 pursuing	 a	 policy	 of	 enhancing	 the	 stability	 of	 the	
region,	while	at	the	same	time,	not	constraining	the	individual	actors	
in	 regard	 to	 their	 own	 national	 objectives.	 During	 the	 Cold	War	 the	
US	 presence	 in	 the	 region	 provided	 a	 bulwark	 against	 communist	
threats,	either	domestic	or	international.	Today,	however,	following	the	
election	 of	 George	W.	 Bush	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 neo-conservatives	 in	
Washington	policy-making	circles,	there	is	an	increasing	perception	of	
the	United	States	as	a	potential	threat	to	the	status	quo	in	the	region	
(Xiang	2001).	Owen	Harries	 (2004,	p.	85)	 cautions	 that	 as	 the	global	
hegemon	 the	 United	 States	 will	 “create	 a	 world	 in	 its	 own	 image	
with	institutions	and	rules	determined	by	Washington”	and	that	these	
may	not	coincide	with	the	national	interests	of	either	Australia	or	the	
Southeast	 Asian	 states.	Moreover,	 he	 argues	 that	 any	moral	 suasion	
that	Australia	 feels	 that	 it	 can	exercise	on	 the	United	States	because	
of	 the	 credits	 it	 has	 accumulated	 through	 its	 participation	 in	 recent	
US-led	wars	is	illusionary.	Harries	(2004,	p.	87)	argues	that	in	regard	
to	great	powers,	“expectations	of	gratitude	rest	on	shaky	foundations	
…	great	powers	 are	 ‘cold	monsters’	 and	gratitude	 is	not	one	of	 their	
stronger	motivators”.	
Kumar	Ramakrishna	(2002)	argues	that	the	decision	of	the	United	
States	 to	 respond	 to	 the	11	September	2001	attacks	 through	what	he	
describes	 as	 a	 “praetorian	unilateralism”	which	 emphasizes	 the	 role	
of	 force	 in	 achieving	 US	 policy	 objectives,	 only	 exacerbates	 anti-
American	sentiments	among	some	Muslims	in	Southeast	Asia.	“While	
military	victories	may	be	achieved	over	 the	 short	 term	 the	 failure	 to	
address	the	sources	of	Muslim	anti-Americanism	in	the	Middle	East,	
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Southeast	Asia,	and	elsewhere	will	only	ensure	that	Al-Qaeda	and	its	
ideological	bedfellows	will	remain	an	existential	threat”	(Ramakrishna	
2002,	p.	 26).	The	danger	 for	Australia	 is	 that	 it	 is	 closely	 associated	
with	 this	 US	 praetorian	 unilateralism	 through	 its	 participation	 in	
US-led	coalitions	and	its	prominent	role	in	the	Proliferation	Security	
Initiative.	 In	addition,	 its	own	leadership	of	 interventions	such	as	 in	
East	Timor	 in	1999	and	 the	Solomon	 Islands	 in	2003,	as	well	 as	 the	
lack	of	clarification	over	its	pre-emptive	strike	doctrine	only	increases	
the	 likelihood	of	 an	 attack	on	Australia.	
Bungling relations in Southeast asia: The aSean Treaty 
of amity and Cooperation and Maritime Security Zone
The	 Howard	 government	 further	 exacerbated	 the	 concern	 over	 the	
“Deputy	 Sheriff”	 statement	 and	 pre-emptive	 strike	 doctrine	when	 it	
refused	 to	 sign	 the	 ASEAN	 Treaty	 of	 Amity	 and	 Cooperation	 (TAC)	
at	 the	 2004	 ASEAN	 Summit	 in	 Laos	 and	 when	 in	 December	 2004	
it	 announced	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 1,000	 nautical	 mile	 Maritime	
Information	 Zone.	Many	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 saw	 both	 acts	 as	 further	
evidence	of	Australia’s	aggressive	policy	with	regard	to	the	region	in	
particular.	While	 the	 Summit	was	 not	 all	 bad	 in	 that	 the	 two	 sides	
were	able	to	agree	to	pursue	a	free-trade	agreement	between	Australia	
and	ASEAN,	 the	 failure	 of	 the	Howard	 government	 to	 sign	 the	TAC	
was	 seen	 as	 being	 linked	 with	 the	 policy	 of	 pre-emptive	 strikes	
(Allard	 2004).	Malaysia’s	 Prime	Minister	Abdullah	 Badawi	 (cited	 in	
Bernama daily Malaysian news	2004)	stated	his	disappointment	with	
the	Australian	 refusal	 to	 sign	 the	TAC.
[S]o	 far	 there	 has	 been	no	 [negative]	 impact	 but	 if	 it	 is	 prolonged	
and	if	Australia	takes	actions	that	cause	adverse	results,	the	relations	
would	be	affected	because	they	consider	themselves	free	to	act	since	
they	have	not	 signed	 the	TAC.
Indonesia’s	 Foreign	Ministry	 spokesman	Marty	Natalegawa	 (cited	 in	
Burrell	2004)	stated	that	“the	best	way	for	Australia	to	dispel	fears	of	
its	 intentions	 about	pre-emptive	 strikes	was	 to	 sign	 the	TAC”.
Australia	had	subsequently	 signed	onto	 the	TAC	but	only	when	
the	 ASEAN	 leaders	 made	 it	 clear	 to	 the	 Howard	 government	 that	
Australia’s	 participation	 in	 the	 inaugural	 East	 Asia	 Summit	 (EAS)	
in	Malaysia	 in	December	 2005	was	 conditional	 on	 signing	 the	TAC.	
Australia	 announced	 its	 change	 in	 position	 on	 the	 signing	 the	 TAC	
in	July	2005	and	formally	signed	the	treaty	on	the	eve	of	the	EAS	in	
December	 2005.	As	 a	 precondition	 to	 signing,	Australia	 emphasized	
four	 understandings,	 or	 conditions,	 between	 Australia	 and	 the	
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ASEAN	states	in	regard	to	Australia’s	involvement	in	the	TAC.	These	
understandings	were	 that	 the	TAC	would	not	affect:	first,	Australia’s	
existing	security	relationships	(that	is,	with	the	United	States);	second,	
Australia’s	rights	and	responsibilities	under	the	UN	charter;	third,	its	
relationships	with	 others	 outside	 of	 Southeast	Asia;	 and	 finally	 that	
Australia	 retained	 a	 veto	 over	 ASEAN	 involvement	 in	 any	 dispute	
involving	Australia	 (Kelly	2005;	 IISS	2005).
Australia	caused	further	tension	in	its	relations	with	its	regional	
neighbours	again	in	December	2004	when	it	announced	a	1,000	nautical	
mile	 Maritime	 Information	 Zone.	 In	 this,	 Australia	 announced	 that	
upon	 entering	 the	 “zone”	 all	 ships	 intending	 to	 travel	 to	 Australia	
would	 need	 to	 provide	 information	 about	 its	 identity,	 crew,	 cargo,	
location,	 destination,	 and	 ports	 of	 call	 (Shanahan	 2004).	 While,	 in	
effect,	 being	 very	 similar	 to	 the	 previous	 requirement	 of	 ships	 to	
provide	 its	 details	 when	 it	 was	 48	 hours	 away	 from	 entry	 into	 an	
Australian	 port,3	 the	 regional	 response	 to	 this	 announcement	 was	
negative.	 The	Malaysian	 Prime	Minister	 stated	 “it	 is	 a	move	 that	 is	
bound	 to	 cause	 unease	 as	 no	 country	 likes	 to	 be	 treated	 in	 such	 a	
manner”	 (cited	 in	Chok	2004).	 Indonesia	 also	 rejected	 the	plan.	The	
Indonesian	 Foreign	Ministry	 spokesman	Marty	 Natalegawa	 (cited	 in	
Moore	 2004)	 stated	 “if	 Indonesia	 is	 asked	 for	 our	 view,	 it	 is	 a	 clear	
resounding	and	unequivitable	no.	It	clearly	contravenes	international	
law,	 it	 contravenes	 Indonesia’s	 territorial	 sovereignty”.
Both	of	these	issues	are	of	relatively	minor	importance	in	regard	
to	 the	overall	positive	nature	 of	 the	 relations	between	Australia	 and	
the	ASEAN	members.	The	TAC	issue	did	not	preclude	the	agreement	
on	a	free-trade	deal	at	the	2004	ASEAN	Summit	or	indeed	Malaysia’s	
invitation	for	Australia	and	New	Zealand	to	attend	the	ASEAN	Summit	
in	2005.	Likewise,	 the	Maritime	Information	Zone	 is	no	more	 than	a	
codifying	 of	 existing	 arrangements.	 That	 the	 Australian	 government	
allowed	these	to	be	blown	out	of	all	proportion	and	cause	significant	
damage	to	Australia’s	reputation	in	the	region,	however,	is	demonstrative	
of	the	manner	in	which	it	seeks	to	manage	its	relations	with	Southeast	
Asia.	For	example,	Australia	took	considerably	more	flak	from	Southeast	
Asian	policy	and	public	opinion–makers	in	the	lead-up	to	the	ASEAN	
Summit	 than	did	New	Zealand,	which	also	 refused	 to	sign	 the	TAC.	
Likewise,	 the	 reporting	 of	 the	 December	 2004	 announcement	 of	 the	
Maritime	Information	Zone	by	many	influential	regional	news	media	
as	 an	Australian	proclamation	of	 a	 “security	 zone”	only	exacerbated	
relations	 between	Australia	 and	 its	 neighbours.	 The	 impression	 that	
Australia	was	making	some	sort	of	territorial	claim	had	to	be	clarified	
by	Michael	Wood	 (2004),	 the	Acting	Australian	High	 Commissioner	
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to	 Singapore,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 editor	 of	 the	 Singapore	 newspaper	
Business Times.	Indeed,	the	announcement	was	as	much	of	a	surprise	
to	officials	of	the	Australian	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	
as	 it	was	 to	 the	 region.4	The	Howard	 government	 acknowledged	 the	
mismanagement	of	the	Maritime	Information	Zone	by	first	seeking	to	
change	 quietly	 the	name	of	 the	policy	 from	 a	 “zone”	 to	 a	 “system”.	
Secondly,	 by	 formally	 announcing	 in	 July	 2005	 the	 restructuring	 of	
the	 Australian	Maritime	 Information	 System	 to	 apply	 to	 ships	 only	
within	500	nautical	miles	 of	 an	Australian	destination	port.5
Changes to australia’s Strategic doctrine
The	significance	of	negative	implications	for	Australia’s	relations	with	
the	 region	 is	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 all	 of	 this	Australia	 has	 announced	
changes	 to	 the	 strategic	 concept	 of	 the	ADF	 away	 from	 the	 defence	
of	Australia	doctrine	 to	one	 that	 allows	 the	ADF	 to	operate	 far	 from	
Australia’s	shores.	The	2000	Defence	White	Paper	first	signalled	these	
changes	 when	 it	 articulated	 a	 change	 to	 a	 more	 proactive	 military	
strategy	that	would	allow	Australia	the	ability	to	control	its	maritime	
approaches,	attack	“hostile	forces	as	far	from	our	shores	as	possible”,	
deploy	preponderant	force	into	Australia’s	immediate	neighbourhood,	
and	make	a	substantial	contribution	to	any	coalition	in	Southeast	Asia.	
The	2003	and	2005	Strategic	Reviews	announced	further	restructuring	
of	 the	 ADF.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 create	 an	 ADF	 that	 is	 adaptable	 and	
versatile	in	meeting	and	sustaining	the	demands	of	diverse	operations	
and	 coalitions	 be	 they	 in	 the	 immediate	 neighbourhood	 or	 further	
afield.	
These	 changes	 signalled	 to	Southeast	Asian	 states	 an	 increasing	
propensity	 for	 Australia	 to	 project	 armed	 forces	 into	 the	 region.	
Although	this	would	be	welcomed	by	some	regional	players,	Australia’s	
lack	of	a	comprehensive	regional	engagement	programme,	coupled	with	
Southeast	 Asia’s	 negative	 perception	 of	 many	 of	 the	 broad	 security	
initiatives	 of	 the	United	 States	 leaves	 room	 for	Australia’s	 proactive	
strategy	 to	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 problematic	 (Bolton	 2003;	 Woodman	
2001,	pp.	 33–34).
Implications for Relations between Australia and Southeast Asia
Significance of australian Policy vis-à-vis 
Southeast asia’s Strategic Cultures
Although	 Southeast	 Asia	 is	 a	 diverse	 region	 in	 terms	 of	 politics,	
religion,	 and	 colonial	 experience	 and	 while	 there	 is	 no	 common	
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strategic	 culture	 among	 the	 states	 of	 the	 region,	 there	 are	 a	 number	
of	common	security	concerns	derived	 from	their	strategic	geography,	
historical	 experience,	 and	 the	 challenges	 of	 economic	 development.	
The	first	of	these	is	the	absolute	priority	accorded	to	the	maintenance	
of	national	sovereignty	and	territorial	integrity.	Southeast	Asia’s	history	
of	 resisting	 and	 accommodating	 cultural	 and	 military	 challenges	
from	 India	and	China,	 the	Western	colonial	powers,	 and	 the	various	
Cold	War	protagonists	has	 led	 to	a	heightened	sensitivity	 to	external	
interference.	 The	 threat	 of	 major	 power	 intervention,	 complicated	
and	 often-disputed	 borders,	 long-standing	 insurrections,	 and	 limited	
conventional	 military	 capabilities,	 have	 all	 conspired	 to	 encourage	
most	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 of	 Southeast	 Asia	 to	 assume	 defensive	
postures.	 Singapore	 stands	 out	 as	 the	 one	 exception,	with	 its	 trade-
reliant	 economy	 giving	 it	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 accommodating	major	
external	powers,	and	its	lack	of	strategic	depth	forcing	it	to	adopt	an	
aggressive	 defence	 strategy	 backed	 by	 a	 well-equipped	 and	 trained	
military	 force.
The	 second	 common	 aspect	 of	 security	 among	 many	 of	 the	
Southeast	 Asian	 states	 is	 that	 they	 view	 security	 in	 comprehensive	
terms.	 As	 developing	 states	 without	 strong	 political	 and	 economic	
institutions,	 the	 Southeast	 Asian	 states	 must	 cater	 for	 not	 only	
military	threats	but	also	political,	economic,	and	socio-cultural	threats.	
Politically	 this	 has	 resulted	 in	 regime	 survival	 as	 being	 equated	
with	national	 security	 in	 authoritarian	 states	 such	 as	Vietnam,	Laos,	
Cambodia,	 and	 Myanmar.	 Moreover,	 these	 states	 tend	 to	 see	 issues	
such	 as	 globalization,	 refugee	 flows,	 and	 cultural	 change	 as	 threats	
to	 their	 national	 sovereignty/regime	 survival	more	 than	 do	 states	 in	
the	West	 (Collins	2000,	 2003;	Neher	 2002;	Bolton	2003).
Moreover,	 these	 non-military	 threats	 have	 also	 tended	 to	 come	
from	 within	 the	 state	 as	 regimes	 face	 challenges	 from	 religious	 or	
ethnic	 separatists,	 communist	 rebels,	 or	 Islamic	 extremists.	 These	
insurrections	 have	 their	 roots	 in	 economic	 inequality	 and	 the	
suppression	 of	minority	 interests	 by	 nation-building	 elites	 and	 they	
continue	 to	 threaten,	 in	 varying	 strength,	 the	 unity	 of	 many	 of	 the	
Southeast	Asian	states,	especially	Indonesia,	the	Philippines,	Thailand,	
Vietnam,	Cambodia,	Laos,	 and	Burma.	These	 internal	 threats	 further	
enhance	 the	 structure	 of	 Southeast	 Asia’s	 armed	 forces	 and	 amplify	
sensitivities	to	external	interference	in	internal	conflicts	(Collins	2000,	
2003;	Neher	 2002;	Bolton	2003).
Finally,	 although	 Southeast	Asia	 has	 sought	 to	 build	 a	 range	 of	
cooperative	 security	 mechanisms	 to	 guard	 against	 external	 threats,	
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it	 continues	 to	 adopt	 a	 realist	 approach	of	 investing	 in	defence	 self-
reliance	within	 a	 balance	 of	 power	 framework.	While	 the	 Southeast	
Asian	states	participate	 in	a	 range	of	 international	organizations	and	
cooperative	security	mechanisms	(which	liberal	institutionalists	argue	
states	enter	into	in	order	to	strengthen	the	norms	that	these	institutions	
represent),	 the	 Southeast	 Asian	 support	 for	 multilateral	 institutions	
can	be	seen	as	an	effective	way	for	them	to	collectively	amplify	their	
limited	political	power	(Bolton	2003;	Emmers	2003).	Because	of	these	
security	 concerns,	 the	Southeast	Asian	 states	 tend	 to	 approach	 their	
relations	 with	 Australia,	 a	 Western	 state	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 Southeast	
Asia,	with	 caution	 and	 some	 scepticism.	
australia-Malaysia relations
A	long-term	critic	of	not	only	Australia,	but	also	the	United	Kingdom	
and	 the	 United	 States,	 Malaysia	 under	 its	 former	 Prime	 Minister	
Mohamad	Mahathir	 at	 varying	 times	played	 the	 anti-Australian	card	
in	 regard	 to	Malaysia’s	 foreign	policy.	 In	 the	1980s	 and	 early	1990s,	
that	 is,	 during	 the	 Hawke-Keating	 Labor	 governments,	 relations	
between	Malaysia-Australia	 suffered	 over	 a	 number	 of	 crises.	 These	
included	 the	 1986	 capital	 punishment	 of	 convicted	 drug	 smugglers	
and	 Australian	 citizens	 Kevin	 Barlow	 and	 Brian	 Chambers,	 the	
Australian	 Broadcasting	 Corporation’s	 TV	 drama	 embassy,	 the	
Australian-produced	movie	Turtle Beach	 and	 the	1993	“recalcitrant”	
jibe	 by	 Paul	 Keating.	 With	 the	 election	 of	 the	 Howard	 government	
in	 1996,	 Australian-Malaysian	 relations	 continued	 to	 roller-coaster	
with	Mahathir	 leading	 the	 anti-Australia	 protests	 over	 the	 “Howard	
Doctrine”,	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 Australia	 led	 the	 1999	 East	 Timor	
InterFET	 force	 and	 the	 “Deputy	 Sheriff”	 controversy	 (Broinowski	
2003,	 p.	 188).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 despite	 these	
crises,	 defence	 and	 security	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 have	 always	
remained	 on	 a	 positive	 basis.	 The	 Malaysia-Australia	 Joint	 Defence	
Program	 (MAJDP)	 manages	 defence	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 and	
provides	 a	 structured	 framework	 for	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 bilateral	
defence	 interaction.	Australia	also	maintains	a	presence	at	 the	Royal	
Malaysian	 Air	 Force	 (RMAF)	 Base	 Butterworth	 and	 is	 Malaysia’s	
major	 source	 of	 military	 training.	 Both	 are	 active	 members	 of	 the	
Five	 Power	 Defence	 Arrangements	 (FPDA)	 and	 in	 August	 2002,	
Australia	and	Malaysia	signed	an	agreement	to	cooperate	in	combating	
international	 terrorism	 (Australia	Department	 of	 Foreign	Affairs	 and	
Trade	 2004).
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With	 the	 retirement	 of	 Mahathir	 and	 the	 election	 of	 Abdullah	
Badawi	 as	Malaysia’s	Prime	Minister,	Malaysian-Australian	 relations	
have	 been	 re-invigorated.	 While	 neither	 country	 puts	 it	 in	 such	
simplistic	 terms,	 the	 turning	point	 of	Australian-Malaysian	 relations	
is	commonly	accepted	as	occurring	with	the	withdrawal	of	Mahathir	
from	the	international	scene.6	The	high	water	mark	in	these	relations	
occurred	in	June	2004	when	Australia	joined	with	its	FPDA	partners	to	
announce	that	they	would	cooperate	in	anti-piracy	and	anti-maritime	
terrorism	training	through	the	FPDA	and	in	November	with	Malaysia	
inviting	Australia	and	New	Zealand	to	attend	the	2005	ASEAN	Summit.	
However,	as	discussed	above,	the	negative	aspects	of	the	relationship	
that	 harken	 back	 to	 the	 bad	 old	 days	 have	 tempered	 the	 positive	
initiatives.	Moreover,	basing	 the	strength	of	 the	bilateral	 relationship	
on	the	personal	ties	of	the	national	leaders,	rather	than	long-standing	
policy	 commitments,	 is	dangerous.
australia-indonesia relations
Relations	 with	 Indonesia	 which	 arguably	 reached	 a	 high	 point	 in	
1995	 with	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Maintaining	 Security	
was	 reduced	 to	 an	 all-time	 low	 in	 1999	 over	 the	Australian-led	UN	
InterFET	 mission	 to	 oversee	 East	 Timor’s	 independence	 and	 then	
the	 people-smuggling/boat-people	 crisis	 during	 the	 2001	 Australian	
Federal	 Election.	While	 debate	 continues	 over	 the	manner	 in	which	
both	 the	 Indonesian	 and	 the	 Howard	 governments	 handled	 the	
crises,	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 deteriorated	 to	 such	 a	
point	 that	 in	2001	 the	 Indonesian	President	Megawati	Soekarnoputri	
would	not	 take	Howard’s	 call	 to	 discuss	 the	 people-smuggling	 issue	
(Broinowski	 2003,	 pp.	 177–86,	 230).	Australian-Indonesian	 relations	
have	 slowly	 improved	 from	 these	 low	 points,	 although	 the	 2006	
Papuan	 refugee	 crisis	 demonstrates	 how	 quickly	 relations	 between	
the	 two	 can	 sour.7	 Relations	 between	 Australia	 and	 Indonesia	
started	 to	 improve	 following	 the	 12	 October	 2002	 Bali	 bombing	
when	 Australia	 and	 Indonesia	 police	 and	 intelligence	 forces	 co-
operated	 effectively	 in	 the	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 those	
responsible.	 Similar	 cooperation	 is	 occurring	 in	 regard	 to	 the	
investigation	 over	 the	 9	 September	 2004	 bombing	 of	 the	 Australian	
embassy	 in	 Jakarta	 and	 the	 1	 October	 2005	 Bali	 Jimbaran	 and	
Kuta	 bombings.	 Australia	 also	 signed	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Under-
standing	 on	 counter-terrorism	 with	 Indonesia	 in	 February	 2002.	 In	
addition,	 relations	between	the	 two	countries	 improved	dramatically	
because	 of	 Australia’s	 quick	 and	 generous	 direct	 assistance	 in	
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response	 to	 the	 Boxing	 Day	 tsunami	 that	 devastated	 the	 Indonesian	
province	 of	 Aceh	 (Burrell	 2005).	 Australia	 was	 also	 quick	 to	 offer	
aid	 and	 assistance	 to	 Indonesia	 following	 the	 2006	 earthquake	 in	
central	 Java.	 While	 this	 cooperation	 and	 assistance	 can	 serve	 as	 a	
basis	 for	 positive	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 states,	 it	 is	 worrying	
that	 improvements	 to	 the	 Australian-Indonesian	 relationship	 have	
come	 only	 after	 terrorist	 attacks	 that	 killed	 hundreds	 of	 innocent	
civilians	 and	 a	 natural	 disaster	 that	 killed	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	
of	 Indonesians	 alone.
Positive relations between australia and Southeast asia
This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 relations	 between	 Australia	 and	 its	
regional	neighbours	 are	 all	 bad.	Australia	has	 sought	 to	 engage	with	
the	 regional	 powers	 on	 a	 more	 independent	 basis	 on	 a	 number	 of	
diplomatic	and	economic	issues.	Moreover,	many	small	and	medium-
sized	 Southeast	 Asian	 states	 look	 to	 Australia	 for	 support	 in	 many	
regional	 and	 global	 security	 and	 other	 diplomatic	 issues.	 Australia	
in	 the	 past	 had	 also	 taken	 a	 leadership	 role	 in	 other	 international	
fora.	In	1989	Australia	was	instrumental	in	the	formation	of	the	Asia-
Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	 (APEC)	group	and	has	worked	closely	
with	other	APEC	members	 to	strengthen	 the	 rules	and	norms	of	 that	
group.	While	 the	 continued	 role	 of	 APEC	 is	 in	 doubt	 following	 the	
Asian	 financial	 crisis,	 Australia’s	 support	 in	 the	 principles	 behind	
APEC	 are	 positive	 for	 the	 region.	 Australia	 has	 also	 played	 a	 key	
role	 in	 spearheading	 the	 UN	 involvement	 in	 Cambodia	 where	
Australia	 took	 a	 leading	 position	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 UN	
plan	 to	 restore	 order	 to	 Cambodia,	 disarm	 the	 various	 factions,	 and	
undertake	 administrative	 control	 of	 the	 country	 for	 one	 year	 and	 to	
prepare	 for	 and	monitor	 elections.	
The	 Howard	 government’s	 preferred	 engagement	 strategy	 with	
the	 Asia-Pacific	 in	 general	 and	 Southeast	 Asia	 in	 particular	 is	
through	 direct	 bilateral	 relationships	 that	 focus	 on	 trade	 and	 good	
governance	 issues.	 Indeed,	 the	 government	 responds	 to	 its	 critics	
that	claim	it	cannot	engage	with	the	region	by	pointing	to	the	bilateral	
free-trade	 agreements	 it	 has	 signed	 with	 Thailand	 and	 Singapore	
and	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 completing	 scoping	 studies	 on	
free-trade	 agreements	 with	 China	 and	 Malaysia	 (Atkins	 2004;	
Sutherland	2005).	 It	 is	also	pushing	similar	agreements	with	ASEAN	
as	 a	 whole	 and	 with	 Japan.	 Proponents	 of	 the	 Howard	 government	
also	argue	 that	 it	demonstrates	 its	 ability	 to	work	with	 regional	gov-
ernments	 in	 the	 security	 area.	 Australia	 since	 1996	 has	 instigated	 a	
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series	 of	 bilateral	 security	 dialogues	 with	 China,	 Indonesia,	 Japan,	
South	 Korea,	 Vietnam,	 Philippines,	 Thailand,	 Russia,	 and	 India	
(Australia	 Department	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 Trade	 2005).	 Finally,	
as	 mentioned	 above,	 it	 was	 able	 to	 develop	 close	 cooperation	 with	
Indonesian	police	and	intelligence	agencies	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Bali	
bombing	and	this	has	been	extended	to	general	cooperation	between	
the	 two	 governments	 on	 a	 number	 of	 issues,	 including	 people	
smuggling.8
The	maintenance	of	all	these	initiatives	is	important	but	Australia	
needs	 to	 take	 care	 at	 the	 political/governmental	 level	 to	 manage	
effectively	 both	 the	 individual	 relationships	 but	 also	 Australia’s	
relations	 with	 Southeast	 Asia	 as	 a	 whole.	 Australia	 also	 needs	 to	
pay	 careful	 attention	 to	 the	 perception	 that	 its	 policies	 generate	 in	
the	 region	 and	 actively	 work	 to	 prevent	 any	misperceptions	 arising	
and	to	prevent	the	exploitation,	by	anti-Australian	elements	that	may	
exist	 within	 the	 region,	 of	 any	 of	 these	 misperceptions.
Conclusion
This	article	has	examined	those	aspects	of	 the	Howard	government’s	
(mis)management	 of	 regional	 and	 defence	 policy	 that	 tends	 to	
impede	 Australia’s	 efforts	 to	 build	 effective	 relationships	 with	
Southeast	 Asia.	 Australia’s	 unique	 position	 as	 a	 Western	 political	
and	 cultural	 state	 and	 close	 US	 ally	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 Southeast	 Asia	
has	 made	 it,	 from	 time	 to	 time,	 a	 convenient	 focus	 for	 Southeast	
Asian	 fears	 of	 Western	 and	 US	 economic,	 cultural,	 and	 military	
challenges	to	the	sovereignty	and	aspirations	of	these	states.	Australia	
needs	 to	 build	 on	 the	 positive	 relations	 it	 has	 with	 the	 states	 in	
the	 region	 at	 both	 the	 political	 and	 military	 level	 to	 mitigate	 these	
concerns.	 The	 mismanagement	 of	 various	 security	 and	 defence	
policies	 by	 the	 Howard	 government	 in	 the	 past	 is	 a	 cause	 of	
concern.	The	Howard	 government,	 or	 indeed	 any	possible	 successor	
government,	 needs	 to	 improve	 its	 record	 in	 this	 regard	 in	 order	
to	 more	 effectively	 build	 on	 the	 multitude	 of	 positive	 aspects	 of	
the	 relationships	 between	Australia	 and	 the	 states	 of	 Southeast	 Asia.
NOTES
1	 The	Australian	concept	of	pre-emptive	self-defence	differs	 from	the	pre-emption	
doctrine	 as	 articulated	 in	 the	 US	National	 Security	 Strategy.	 For	 Australia	 pre-
emption	would	only	be	in	reaction	to	an	identified	imminent	 threat	of	an	attack	
that	 the	 “host”	 state	 is	 either	unable,	 or	unwilling,	 to	 act	 against	 itself.
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2	 This	 argument	 has	 been	 raised	 with	 the	 author	 by	 so	 many	 officials	 and	
commentators	 during	my	 research	 that	 a	 list	 would	 run	 several	 pages	 and	 still	
probably	miss	people	out.
3	 At	an	average	speed	of	21	knots	a	ship	will	travel	1,008	nautical	miles	in	48	hours	
(Wood	2004).
4	 Comments	made	to	the	author	by	several	personnel	of	the	Department	of	Foreign	
Affairs	 and	Trade	both	 at	 the	 time	 and	 in	 subsequent	 interviews.
5	 On	21	February	2005	Andrew	Metcalfe	 the	Deputy	Secretary	 to	 the	Department	
of	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 Cabinet	 in	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 2005	 National	 Security	
Australia	 Conference	 referred	 to	 the	 policy	 as	 a	 system	 rather	 than	 a	 zone.	 See	
Metcalfe	 (2005)	 and	Bockmann	 (2005).
6	 The	 author	 commonly	 heard	 this	 expressed	 during	 research	 trips	 to	 Malaysia	
in	 2004	 and	 2006.	 Some	 Malaysian	 commentators,	 such	 as	 Dato	 Mohamed	
Jawhar	Hassan,	the	then	Deputy	Director-General	of	the	Institute	of	Strategic	and	
International	 Studies	 (ISIS)	 Malaysia	 in	 an	 interview	 with	 the	 author	 in	 July	
2004,	 argued	 that	 Australia	 needed	 to	 remain	 cautious	 in	 its	 relations	
with	Malaysia,	as	Abdullah	would	likely	react	in	a	similar	way	as	that	of	Mahathir	
in	 similar	 circumstances	 as	 those	 identified	 above.	 See	 also	 Baker	 (2004).
7	 In	 interviews	 in	 Indonesia	 in	2004	many	of	my	 interlocutors	 stressed	 the	depth	
and	strength	of	the	Indonesian-Australian	relationship	at	the	individual,	business,	
and	 even	 inter-governmental	 levels	 even	 during	 the	 height	 of	 the	 official	 crises	
between	 the	 two	countries.
8	 Evidence	 of	 this	 cooperation	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 speech	 by	Ambassador	 Imron	
Cotan	 (2005).
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